Marketing Topical Research Paper

Global commercialiseing topical Research Paper Chu Nguyen Binh DBA Hanoi NorthCentral University (NCU), USA National University of Hanoi (Vietnam) direful 2009 Research title Where would be the securities industriousness for strange affirms in Vietnam afterward joining WTO? ABBREVIATION BTABilateral Trade Agreement CARCapital Adequacy Ratio FBBForeign buzzword Branch FIBForeign Invested commit JSCBJoint Stock money qualification(prenominal) swan JVBJoint Venture situate MOFMinistry of Finance NPLNon-Performing lend SBV democracy Bank of Vietnam SOCBState possess Commercial Bank SOEState Owned Enterp emendment SMESm all and Medium- coatd Enterprise SSCState Securities CommissionWBWorld Bank WTOWorld Trade geological formation gameboard OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATION regard 1. INTRODUCTION1 2. VIETNAM BANKING SECTOR A thick desexualise1 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VIETNAMESE BANKING INDUSTRY3 3. 1. rattling Low merchandise Penetration3 3. 2. Rate of Growth in Both Loans a nd Deposits farther Exceeding GDP Growth3 3. 3. A highly Concent pass judgmentd further Highly Fragmented Banking Market4 3. 4. Heavy Handed Regulation with Restrictions on Foreign Banks5 3. 5. privation of Transpargonncy Concerning Quality of L closedowning6 3. 6. Heavily nether superiorized7 3. 7. Narrow R up to promptlyue Base and few Product Offerings7 3. 8.Unknown Quantity of Non-performing Loans8 4. vexation ENVIRONMENT FOR THE BANKING SECTOR9 4. 1. The G all e verywherenments Strategy9 4. 2. State Bank of Vietnam Freeing the Tiger9 4. 3. Regulatory Environment Meeting world(prenominal)ist Standards10 4. 4. Developing the Capital Markets11 5. PROSPECTS FOR BANKING SECTOR GOING FORWARD12 5. 1. Non-Performing Loan Ratios to Rise, scarcely Risks of Bank Failures Looms12 5. 2. Further Development Inhibited by Low Capital and Technology12 6. CONCLUSION14 REFERENCES15 ABSTRACT Vietnams affirming placement is loomd by tailfin subject-owned chamfers, with around 70% o f system assets at end-2008.Around 38 private banks comprise manywhat an some other 25%, with the balance impregnablely accounted for by a multitude of distant banks. In recent courses, the private banks, being much technically oriented, extradite bendn quick at the expense of the rural argona-owned banks trade sh ar. The unlike banks come too grown, as opportunities improved for them after Vietnam entered a symmetrical trade agreement with the US in 2001 and acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006. The Research Paper impart shew the Vietnams banking ara as a whole, including general characteristics of the Vietnamese banking market.It then analyzes the proportion in term of lend and deposit of aro role-owned, joint depot, joint venture and outside(prenominal) banks. In the fleck part, the report lists opportunities for alien banks to penetrate the Vietnam market beneath newfound legal requirement of the Vietnamese Goernment. They can estab lish ascorbic acid% foreign bank entity, purchase stake in local banks or set up joint venture with Vietnamese partners. Finally, it go away examine strengths and difficulties in terms of technology, expertise and experience, service quality, put on the line appetite, etc. f the foreign banks when operating in Vietnam market. 1. INTRODUCTION There argon a lot of banks in Vietnam. Too many in fact. Currently thither are fivesome state-run commercial banks, 38 joint stock commercial banks, four joint-venture banks, 29 foreign bank offsetes, 45 foreign bank representative offices, five finance companies and nine finance leasing firms operating in Vietnam. Since 1992, Vietnam has moved to a diversified sys-tem in which state-owned, joint-stock, joint-venture and foreign banks go away go to a broader customer base.However, the four main state-owned commercial banks the Bank for enthronement and Development of Vietnam (BIDV), the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank), t he Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (Incombank) and the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) account for around 70% of all lend activity. In a trade agreement with the get together States signed five familys ago, Vietnam fully committed to al pocket- size of itd in foreign banks by 2010 at the latest, and to expose the banking vault of heaven to foreign competition. Under WTO entry rules the door whitethorn consume to be opened even sooner than that.This has prompted foreign banking groups to closely scrutinize the Vietnamese banking arena as a fear opportunity in itself. 2. VIETNAM BANKING SECTOR A SUMMARY Vietnamese banking market is currently dominated by the five major(ip) State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), with 38 semi-private so-called joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs) piecemeal feeding into their market share by better catering to the pauperizations of meek and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and sell clients. Years of lax monetary policy cerebrate on seconding export-led GDP ingathering has flooded the banking system with money, get-up-and-go up redit growth to an one-year average of 36. 4% over the past times five years (2003-2007), hitting a peak of 54. 9% conclusion year according to World Bank figures. High liquidity and a scramble for market share conduct resulted in a mark of aggressive lending, in contingent to investments in the real estate and stock markets, which both experienced rapid downturns in 2007 and premature 2008. State-Owned Commercial Banks The five SOCBs Agribank, Bank for Investment and Development (BIDV), Vietcombank, Vietinbank and Vietnam Development Bank hold or so both thirds of banking assets according to IMF sources.The SOCBs are still encumbered by their precedent role as instruments for implementing governance policy. Indeed, the strong links between higher-ranking bank executives and the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam, and other state-owned enterprises (SOE s) have hinder much-needed corporate restructuring. Hence, SOEs still receive preferential treatment in addword allocation, resulting in the SOCBs running up high non-performing loan (NPL) ratios. The SOCBs are currently reporting NPL ratios of around 3%, except we are expecting this figure to rise to 5% to begin with the end of 2008.However, we carry doubts slightly the reliability of authoritative figures and suspect the real ratios could be significantly higher. Joint-Stock Commercial Banks The 38 JSCBs currently control roughly 20-25% of banking assets in Vietnam, but are quickly eating into the market shares of the bigger SOCBs by providing superior services to SMEs and retail savers. The JSCBs are generally better managed and more profit up to(p) than the SOCBs, but suffer from hapless great(p)isation, which has profess them vulnerable to Vietnams internal acknowledgement crunch, prompted by the SBVs rapid alter of its monetary policy.Foreign Banks HSBC and Standa rd Chartered and a number of other foreign banks are already present in the Vietnamese market through joint ventures with JSCBs. HSBC adjoind its stake in Techcombank to 20% in August and Standard Chartered snarfd its stake in Asia Commercial Bank (ACB) to 15% in May 2008, but foreign banks have been prevented from increasing their stakes by restrictions on foreign monomania of home(prenominal) banks. Vietnam currently limits the shareholding a foreign bank can take in a interior(prenominal) counterpart to 20%, with the total foreign self-command limited to 30%. 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VIETNAMESE BANKING INDUSTRY . 1. Very Low Market Penetration There are wholly around six cardinal bank accounts in Vietnam, five million of them for individuals which amounts to a perceptivity rate of about 6%. In reality, the pictureual po ecstasytial market size is about 20 million or trebles the current incursion direct. That is the size of the AB socioeconomic class in Vietnam. Eve n so, if we compare this to the meshing and mobile penetration rate of 14% and 12% the number is quite a down(p). The reason is simple the distribution and infrastructure of banking services is very unretentive relative to the telecommunications industry, which has virtual national coverage.By contrast, banks are almost unhearable of in secondary cities and rural areas. With a low urban people of about 29%, banks simply dont have unaffixed irritate to over 70% of the population. There are other reasons, of course. Until lately the government had encouraged a cash economy by stipendiary state employees in cash thither is a traditional surmise of banks the banks themselves have done a poor job of providing services to the sell public and small businesses too are poorly served by banks disinclined to give them large loans unless they have the confirmatory to back it up.Of course the banking industry is growing rapidly with both deposits and loans expanding at high, double-d igit growth rates per annum. And some banks such as Vietcombank, ACB, Sacombank, and Techcombank are making a determined stew to court the retail market. 3. 2. Rate of Growth in Both Loans and Deposits utmost Exceeding GDP Growth Credit growth in Vietnam has been expanding at a breakneck speed these last few years. Not amazingly given heady GDP growth. Nonetheless, the sustained rate of add-on over several years has boostd eyebrows at world-wide bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.They like their course credit growth at room temperature, or else than piping hot. Well piping hot is what theyve got. In fact, the state-owned banks saw credit grow at an annual average rate of 24% over the past five years. Given the inability of some bankers to distinguish a good credit take a chance from a gravely one (assuming they have a choice) this is not entirely a good thing. Hence the international sigh of disbelief that such stellar credit growth has been attach to by a falling NPL r atio.According to some economists a 7% GDP growth rate can accommodate an annual credit growth rate of about 14-20%, roughly a factor of two without generating a lending bubble. However, credit growth rates above that take for any extended period of time are unhealthy for an economy. true credit growth rates have been falling for the last year down to about 15% as the primordial bank has essay to rein in credit departments. So far this year in fact lending has expanded at but about 16% nationwide. Going forward the speed of credit growth may intumesce start expanding again as WTO becomes a reality. maven bank has calibre that credit could grow at 35% per annum over the next five years given sufficient bother to chapiter. While the better banks could probably cope with this, the temptation for others to take on too much risk is high. 3. 3. A Highly Concentrated but Highly Fragmented Banking Market Five state banks have carved up 70% of the loan market time forty-odd joint- stock banks and a host of foreign banks scrap for the rest 30%. Compare this with the US where the ten biggest commercial banks control only 49% of the countrys banking assets, up from 29% a go ago.Thus, at the top tier, the market acts like an oligopoly, while beneath the scrape there is a holy war going on as mite-sized private sector banks scrap for the rest. Since the market itself is growing so spry this may not seem so bad. The state banks are withal slowly bleeding market share. Even so things look very lopsided. Enter the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), concerned about the fragmented record of the private sector banks. They will introduce new regulations to force some other round of consolidation in the near future.One way of doing this is to set high hurdles for any new established bank before it can get a license. wholly banks will need to have chartered capital of VND 1 trillion ($62. 8 million) which is exceeded by the alive capital of only the very biggest JSCBs such as ACB and Sacombank. All other existing banks fall far short and will need to scramble for new capital or merge in set to meet the new requirements. And that is just the first round. From next year the SBV has circulated a draft proposal to raise the minimum capital level to about US$300 million.And there you have the consolidation trigger. 50% of the JSCBs face merger or takeover. They will also have to record experience in banking governance. Banks will need to commit to Basel 2 standards from 2010. One of the key disregards is the regulation of key stakeholders, such as a criterion on lending to stakeholders or their affiliates. This is to prevent corporations from using their own banks as private piggy-banks. Currently a corporate of family can own up to 40% of a joint-stock commercial bank. 3. 4. Heavy Handed Regulation with Restrictions on Foreign BanksThe government still exerts strong control on the banking sector in two ways. Directly, through various regulations and restrictions which govern how they conduct business and strictly licensing the type of businesses they can enter and indirectly through the tour of a myriad of agencies and ministries, both local and national, who want to have a say on how scarce credit resources are allocated. The state-owned banking system is essay to shift from directed policy lending to a commercial system. But the transition is proving slow and painful.Given the legacy of state control at both national and local level its hardly surprise that the state-owned banks routinely complain about arrest in their lending decisions and general perplexity. It seems that banking is too important to be left to bankers. The culture of social and policy-making lending is still dominant amongst local ex officios and bureaucrats, as is the idea of consensus structure and consultation before decisions are taken. To be fair, the problem has been recognized and things are getting better.With the proposed re-organizat ion of the SBV for example, fewer local branches should reduce the amount of day-to-day disturbance coming in to credit departments. Local authorities will have less leverage in leaning on banks without the local fundamental bank office to back them up. And the recently announced decree allowing for degree centigrade% foreign-owned bank branches will finally set the stage for a level playing field for foreign banks. However, without eliminating limits on branch openings and mobilization of peal deposits (currently limited to 350% of total capital for foreign banks) some painful shackles will remain. . 5. Lack of Transparency Concerning Quality of Lending Lending decisions in Vietnam are still based more on relationships than cash flow. The assessment of loan customers is usually driven by the relationship with the bank and the size of the collateral being offered. Cash flow driven assessment and qualitative synopsis is reserved for large private sector customers only. Amongst t he large banks only ACB bank uses DCF analysis across their entire customer base. The problem is part imputable to outside interference in the decision making process and partly out-of-pocket to a wishing of professional guidance.The absence of IT infrastructure to support professional credit analysis is another major factor. another(prenominal) issue is exposure. Most banks lend a lot of money to a jolly narrow base of customers. The top 30 state-owned corporations probably account for over fractional of the state banks lending books. The private sector joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) are no different. 3. 6. Heavily Undercapitalized One of the legacies of state ownership is a blunt shortage of capital at the state banks, a quality divided up by private sector commercial banks as strong.Government restrictions on equity holdings combined with a bond market that hardly functions has made raising chartered capital very difficult for banks. Average capital adequacy ratios (C AR) in amongst Vietnamese banks stood at 4. 5% at the end of 2007. This compares with an average CAR of 13. 1% in Asia Pacific and 12. 3% in South-East Asia. Admittedly with large scale raising of capital this year this number is improving. With most of the state banks well below the minimum 8% capital adequacy ratio for Tier 2 capital, lack of access to the international capital markets has constrained their growth.And this valuation is anyway based on a vary generous reading of their NPLs. The JSCBs are in only a slightly better state with a handful able to cross the 8% hurdle rate. The rest are pitiful. And given that the internal capital markets are still in the fledgling stages, raising new capital has been the biggest headache for all banks. The stronger JSCBs have responded partly by change shares to foreign strategic partners. Further down the line, where profitability is lower and capital particularly skimpy the options are more limited. The SBV is chary of allowing litt le anks to raise capital from foreign investors. Going forward all of the banks have substantial appetites for raising further capital, to shore up their Tier 2 capital base to bring them over the 8% CAR hurdle by 2010. 3. 7. Narrow Revenue Base and Few Product Offerings Most Vietnamese banks make money from loans. And thats rudimentaryally it. Compare that to Western banks that make about a quarter of their income from fees credit card fees, lending fees, set up fees, etc. and most have branched into wealth management. Well, not in Vietnam.To be fair this is tied into the lack of availability of credit write up banks dont like lending to strangers they know nothing about. The state banks are generally geared to the large corporate and state-owned sector, providing syndicated loans for utilities, infrastructure projects, loaded down(p) industry and property developers. JSCBs are geared mainly towards lending to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the wealthier retail customers. However given their low penetration and limited branch network they only reach a divide of their potential customer base.Car loans, mortgages and house improvement loans are retail staples. And small business loans using property as capital is the basic model for the SME market. In general, the Vietnamese banking model is best described as relationship-based rather than product-based as in international banks. 3. 8. Unknown Quantity of Non-performing Loans If you were to commit the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) statistics the non-performing loans problem has been largely dealt with since 2000. Amongst the state-owned banks, non-performing loans (NPLs) have fallen steadily from 12. % in 2000 to 8. 5%, 8. 0% and 4. 47% in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. Under a new stricter definition, the official number in 2008 has risen to about 7. 7%. Overall, about half of the NPLs are on the watch list, which is the second of five lending categories in the new SBV scoring system. The other half fall into the triplet categories below watch list which are of greater concern. For private sector JSCBs, average NPLs were said to be around the 1% level at the end of 2007. Of course few believe the official numbers.International bodies carried out a similar exercise using Ernst & youthfulness and found that NPLs in the system using international business relationship standard definitions came to about 15-20% of outstanding loans in the state-owned sector. This number is conservative due to limited data a figure between 20-25% is probably a fairer estimate. In this respect the slow development of the banking industry is a invoke in disguise, things could be a whole lot worse. The worry is that the opening night between the official version and the real picture is large and may indeed be growing.Most NPLs are generated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) refusing to pay their obligations to state-owned banks. Pre-equalization is a favorite time to write off or si mply open(a) out these loans. That way SOEs can start their new life in the private sector unencumbered by debts. So apart from communicate the government to honor the SOEs commitment and trying to seize collateral there is precious little banks can do. There is not yet an effective secondary market for bad debt, although attempts to kick-start one are ongoing.There are very few NPLs sale and purchase transaction victorious place. 4. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE BANKING SECTOR 4. 1. The Governments Strategy After a long period of hesitation and hints of action the government has come up with a fast-track roadmap to liberalize the financial sector by 2010. Under the roadmap, the state will retain a controlling stake in the banks but its holdings will be quickly reduced to 51%. Foreign ownership will account for a maximum of 30% of total shares, while each strategic foreign institutional investor currently allowed to hold 10-20% at most.The 20% limit may be eventually erased but th e 30% cap will stay for the time being. Basel 1 will be in effect until 2010, when the stricter Basel 2 standards for corporate governance will be introduced. The government will have to introduce further principle before then to force banks compliance, particularly at the ownership level. This may progress to some buying opportunities amongst the JSCBs as families are forced to reduce their stake. 4. 2. State Bank of Vietnam Freeing the TigerIn theory the cardinal bank enjoys a wide remit. In practice it cant do much without a legion of agencies and ministries throwing in their pennys charge of advice. The central bank, the SBV, currently acts as the sole supervisory and regulatory proboscis for the banking sector. It also owns the state-owned banks and sets interest rates. There is a clear need to separate the various roles of the SBV and give it increased autonomy in those areas such as monetary policy and regulation of the banking sector, which are clearly in its remit.The SBV also needs to be free of its role as custodian of the states shareholdings in the banking sector. The SBV sees several key roles for itself in the future lay in and executing monetary policy, ensuring stability of the credit institutional system, act as a regulator to the banking system. In order to achieve this it needs legislative backing to clearly define its relationship with the National Assembly, government and all government agencies. In simple terms stop the incessant interference from other parties so that the SBV can get on with the job.After all, if the central bank is not allowed to set interest rate policy and amaze the banking sector without being leaned on, what hope is their for individual banks to lend money without getting the same treatment. Another issue is the lack of cooperation with the MOF on key issues such as bad debt and bank equitisation. MOF has often written off state-owned companies bad debt without consulting the banks. And the State Securities Commission (SSC), the stock market regulator often stalls on issuing licenses for banks to list. The two dont play well together. 4. 3. Regulatory Environment Meeting International StandardsThere are a myriad of regulations and decrees covering almost every aspect of the financial sector but we would like to look briefly at just tierce topics progress removing restrictions from foreign banks, see international banking standards and the treatment of NPLs. With regard to meeting international banking standards, the government has appeared to follow WB recommendations to provide the necessary fashion model for an integrated financial system as required under WTO rules. And so in the last few years some of the necessary legislation has been pushed into place. On the NPLs, the central bank issued Decision No. 93 to classify bad debts and risk reserves closer to international norms. So far, three state-owned banks (SOBs) claim to have successfully reduced their bad debt ratios to l ess than 5% in accordance with the new rules. Too successfully in fact, but more on this later. Overall the regulatory authorities are making an effort to converge with international standards in the financial sector, but with WTO rank and the 2010 deadline looming, time is not a friend. And foreign banks are still allowed to raise Dong deposits only to a ceiling of 350% of their chartered capital.In effect this locks them out of the domestic deposit market and is the most important thwarter for their expansion plans. 4. 4. Developing the Capital Markets Banks need more tier 2 capital and bonds will provide the bulk of that. However with the bond market in its infancy there are still major constraints on the banks ability to raise sufficient capital quickly to reach the 8% capital adequacy ratio they crave. The infrastructure for developing the bond market is still not in place. HSBC is only now offering to provide a pilot rating scheme to enable potential investors to gauge the cr editworthiness of various bond issuers.Fitch and Moodys have also dipped their toes in the market, rating Sacombank and BIDV respectively. However rating services are horribly expensive and there needs to be a domestic agency to offer these services at prices most banks can afford. Another key hurdle lies with interest rate guidelines in place at all maturities along the yield curve. This prevents risk weightings and effectively bars smaller or weaker banks from coming to the market to issue capital whilst compensating for the higher risk by offering higher coupons. 5. PROSPECTS FOR BANKING SECTOR GOING FORWARD . 1. Non-Performing Loan Ratios to Rise, But Risks of Bank Failures Looms It is likely that there will be an increase in non-performing loan (NPL) ratios from the present 4-5% as an increasing number of companies and households oversight on their loans on the back of higher interest rates and decelerate economic activity. A complicating factor in assessing the risk posed by deteriorating loan portfolios is that Vietnamese banks are currently applying a new system of internal credit rating schemes and debt classification systems in accordance with international standards.Implementation has so far been diverse between banks, making intra-sector comparisons a complicated business. Consultancy Ernst & Young has estimated that the application of the new standards is likely to lead to an increase in disclosed NPL ratios of 2-3 times, i. e. to the IMF estimates of 15-20%. While the new standards will make the NPL figures more internationally comparable, the resulting increase in the ratios is likely to create uncertainty about the proportion which can be attributed to the new standards and how much is down to an existent deterioration of loan portfolios.However, it can be believed that the effects on the boilers suit economy from possible bank failures can be contained by large JSCBs taking over smaller banks pushed to the brink by loan defaults and low c apitalisation. Nonetheless, there might be possibility that the government or central bank will need to intervene to force mergers between banks and perchance also recapitalize those in worst health. 5. 2. Further Development Inhibited by Low Capital and Technology Consolidation should be a irresponsible for the banking sector by decreasing excessive competition and increasing capitalization levels.Nonetheless, capital shortages, low technology and a shortage of skilled staff, particularly at higher levels, will continue to inhibit the development of the banking sector. This will leave domestic banks exposed to the might of international banking giants such as HSBC and Standard Chartered, which are initially committing US$183 million and US$61 million respectively to their Vietnamese subsidiaries, placing them well in league with the larger JSCBs. Increased competition from foreign players will gum olibanum constitute a potent threat to domestic banks, which will be forced to i mprove services if they want to maintain their market share.Further expansion will need regulatory approval from the State Bank of Vietnam. The IMF has, in its annual check of the Vietnamese economy, set improvement of financial supervision as a prime task for the government in its reform agenda. The government raising the foreign ownership ratio to 25% for individual banks and 35% in total in 2009-2010 in order to maintain foreign banks interest in holding stakes in domestic players, thus assisting in technology transfer.With the current system in place, there is a risk of a severe divide between better-capitalised, more technically advanced and better-managed foreign banks and a still relatively undeveloped domestic sector suffering from both a shortage of capital and low efficiency. Vietnamese banks are still primarily focused on taking deposits and lending and thus completely inexperienced in asset management and other financial services tipped to be the main growth areas in th e Vietnamese banking market going forward.Domestic players, in particular the larger SOCBs, may have an advantage through their established branch network and client base, but this factor can be rapidly eroded as HSBC and Standard Chartered extend their operations. The threat from foreign banks will be particularly potent for the SOCBs, where reform has been slow in spite of the governments intention to place them foremost in the queue in the so-called equitisation process of transferring SOEs to private hands.It is unlikely that the government will pass takers for its offers of 10-20% stakes in SOCBs for strategic foreign players if it does not radically review its privatisation procedures. With the state-owned banks constrained by politicised decision-making and the private banks suffering from a severe lack of capital, HSBC, Standard Chartered and other regional players will gain the upper hand over time as their extensive experience, superior technology, and readier access to capital work in their favor.It is unlikely that foreign players will dominate the Vietnamese banking sector in 10-15 years time, with the larger JSCBs being majority-owned by foreigners and the role of the once-impressive SOCBs reduced to supporting inefficient state-owned companies and agricultural households. 6. CONCLUSION In Vietnam, there is only less than 10% of Vietnamese currently use banks for financial services, instead largely relying on extended families and neighbourhood associations for lending and saving. However, a rising number of younger Vietnamese are now using banks for financial services, opening up great expansion opportunities in retail banking.The Vietnamese banking sector is a veritably good destination for early entrants as poorly-capitalised and inefficient domestic banks are ill-prepared for the opening of the banking market to foreign entrants as pledged in Vietnams accession to the WTO in January 2007. With bank penetration at less than 10% and the Vietn amese economy forecast to grow by an average 7. 8% annually over the next ten years, the growth opportunities are great for foreign players. Top of Form REFERENCES Johny K. Johansson (2006). world(a) MARKETING Foreign Entry, Local Marketing, & Global Management. McGraw-Hill, Fourth Edition, International Edition.ISBN 007-124454-9. Vinacapital. Vietnam rightfulness Research. August 15, 2006 Fitch Ratings, Vietnam Special Report Vietnamese Banks Focus on Asset Quality Three Stress Scenarios. 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